- The funds will always go through the router
- Rename splitSwap for Swap
- Improve tests
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ENG-4041 Took 24 minutes
Took 23 seconds
Took 42 seconds
Add tests to Swap
Modify ExecutionDispatcher and TychoRouter to account for these changes
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ENG-4041 Took 57 minutes
Took 10 seconds
Changes:
- If the tokenIn is ETH, skip permit2 approval
- Make executors payable: When using delegatecall the executor inherits the execution context of whoever calls it. Our main swap function can accept ETH, it needs to be payable so by consequence the executors also need to be.
- Set uniswap v2 executor in test router
- Add tests for all possible cases of swap
- Add tests for all cases of splitSwap
- Add test functions to handle permit2 and encode swaps
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ENG-4041 Took 3 hours 50 minutes
Took 49 seconds
Took 14 seconds
[copied from exact same reasoning with execution code-checking]
I was inspired to do this because, when disabling the slither check for the staticcall when calling the callback verifier, I realized it's not clear from the same contract that we have already checked for contract code existence when setting the verifier. This made me feel uneasy, as this contract can then not stand alone and must rely on the higher level contract to safely check for code existence, otherwise the staticcall is unsafe. Keeping this logic in a separate contract seems error-prone to me, as we may remove the check for code existence without immediately realizing the implications of doing so.
For this reason I have organized it as follows:
- Logic/tests relating to proper roles/access control in the main TychoRouter.
- Lower-level logic/tests that check contract validity before setting the callback verifier in the CallbackVerificationDispatcher
- This is not so relevant for security, but it would sabotage our performance if an executor was wrongly removed, so it's worth it to know every time this happens.
I was inspired to do this because, when disabling the slither check for the delegatecall when calling the swap executor, I realized it's not clear from the same contract that we have already checked for contract code existence when setting the executor. This made me feel uneasy, as this contract can then not stand alone and must rely on the higher level contract to safely check for code existence, otherwise the delegatecall is unsafe. Keeping this logic in a separate contract seems error-prone to me, as we may remove the check for code existence without immediately realizing the implications of doing so.
For this reason I have organized it as follows:
- Logic/tests relating to proper roles/access control in the main TychoRouter.
- Lower-level logic/tests that checks contract validity before setting the executor in the SwapExecutionDispatcher
- Moved the deployment method into a test template for organization
- Created skeletons of dispatcher contracts
- Added all possible test cases for thoroughness
- remappings.txt is used for more elegant imports
- decided not to include all helper methods in skeleton - just main swap method. They are properly documented in the jira tasks.
- add filter-paths to slither to exclude submodules, otherwise we will get slither warnings about permit2 and open-zeppelin using different solidity versions:
```
- Version constraint ^0.8.20 is used by:
-^0.8.20 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol#4)
-^0.8.20 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/access/IAccessControl.sol#4)
-^0.8.20 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Context.sol#4)
-^0.8.20 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/introspection/ERC165.sol#4)
-^0.8.20 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/introspection/IERC165.sol#4)
- Version constraint ^0.8.0 is used by:
-^0.8.0 (lib/permit2/src/interfaces/IAllowanceTransfer.sol#2)
-^0.8.0 (lib/permit2/src/interfaces/IEIP712.sol#2)
- Version constraint ^0.8.28 is used by:
```
